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Indefensibility, Skepticism and Conceptual Truth 
Philipp Keller, Geneva 
It is true of many truths that I do not believe them. It is 
equally true that I cannot rationally assert of any such truth 
that it is true and that I do not believe it. Such a claim is 
indefensible, i.e. for internal reasons unable to convince. I 
claim that such is the skeptic's predicament, trying to 
convince us to bracket knowledge claims we have good 
grounds to take ourselves to be entitled to. An analysis of 
skepticism as an epidemic rather than epistemic challenge 
will shed new light on what it is to doubt a proposition and 
provide us with an analysis of conceptual truths as those 
which cannot rationally be doubted.  
The puzzle of `Moore's paradox', as I understand it, is to 
explain why the following sentence, while true for many 
values of p, is inappropriate to assert;  
(1) p, but I do not believe that p  
I will discuss two approaches to the puzzle which identify 
conversational maxims they take to be flouted, criticise 
them and then present an alternative solution.  
The belief approach takes "p, but I do not believe that p" 
to violate the maxim that one should believe what one 
asserts and then argues that the quoted sentence is 
unbelievable. The problem with this approach is that it has 
to claim that believing that one does not believe that p 
entails that one does not believe that p.  
The knowledge approach, on the other hand, takes it to 
violate the maxim that one should only assert what one 
knows and then argues for its unknowability.  
The alternative solution I favour presupposes only that 
one should believe what one asserts and does not have to 
rely on the dubious principle that one cannot have false 
beliefs about what beliefs one lacks.  
For any sentence p, to believe that p is to take the actual 
world to be a possible world where p is true. For any 
sentence p, to disbelieve that p is to consider it possible 
that a world which verifies ¬p is actual. What does this 
considering it possible that ¬p amount to? Call doxastic 
alternatives for a at t scenarios the actuality of which a 
cannot (indeed should not) rule out given what he takes 
himself to know at t about the world he takes to be actual 
(which may or may not be his real actual world). A doxastic 
alternative for a at t, then, is a way the world might be a 
cannot exclude at t to be a way the world actually is. If a 
believes that p, all his doxastic alternatives make p true; if 
he disbelieves p, one of his doxastic alternatives makes p 
false, i.e.~they make ¬p true. We do not assume that p 
has a truth-value in all of a's doxastic alternatives, neither 
do we assume that no doxastic alternatives make p both 
true and false and hence are impossible.  
Whenever we say of ourselves that we believe that p, 
we incur a commitment to the truth that p -- we claim that 
the real actual world (not only the ones we take to be our 
actual world) is among our doxastic alternatives. When-
ever we learn further truths and acquire true beliefs, we 
narrow down the range of alternatives, hopefully to an 
ideal limit where the actual world would be our only last 
alternative left and we would believe some proposition iff it 
is true. A self-ascription of knowledge or belief is a claim to 
the effect that we are prepared to use some proposition as 
a premise in this process of narrowing down the realm of 
what is left open by what we take ourselves to know. A 
crucial feature of beliefs we claim to have, then, is that 
they must entertainable in worlds which are their only 
doxastic alternative. Any proposition that cannot be 
believed in such a world immediately disqualifies from the 
role conferred to it by a self-ascription of belief in it.  
What lies at the bottom of indefensibility of "p, but I do 
not believe that p" is not the transitivity of doxastic 
alternativeness but the commonly made presupposition 
that what one says might be true even in a state of 
complete information. If I utter p, I therefore commit myself 
to the claim that p might be true even if I knew everything 
about the actual world there is to know, that is, even if the 
actual world were my only doxastic alternative.  
If you utter p, you must consider it possible that you 
would believe p even if you had a maximally specific belief 
set, i.e.~if you would believe all the truths (or, equivalently, 
disbelieve all the falsehoods). If the world in which we 
believe them were our only doxastic alternative, belief in 
"p, but I do not believe that p"would make that world 
inaccessible to us. A belief in (1) makes the world in which 
it is held either doxastically inaccessible to itself or 
contradictory. (1) cannot be rationally believed in worlds 
which are doxastic alternatives of themselves. Taking a 
doxastic alternative to be possibly actual as opposed to 
just merely possible, however, means taking it to be 
doxastically accessible to itself. So no one can take a 
doxastic alternative in which (1) is true to be a possible 
way his actual world, the world of the believer, might be. It 
is instructive to compare "p, but I do not believe that p" to 
the following:  
(2) p, but I do not disbelieve that ¬p. 
(2) can only be believed in worlds which have only non-
reflexive doxastic alternatives. So the believer cannot take 
the world he takes to be actual to be one of its doxastic 
alternatives, not even, as in the case of (1), at the price of 
acknowledging that it is contradictory. He cannot take any 
world to be its doxastic alternative without foresacking that 
it may be possibly actual (for if it were actual, he could not 
take it to be actual).  
The pragmatic maxim violated by an utterance of (2) is 
not, as in the case of Moore's paradox, that one should 
believe what one says but something weaker, i.e. that one 
should disbelieve what one believes to be false. It is thus 
unbelievable in a weaker sense than Moore's paradox.  
The problem with (2) is not the inappropriateness of 
uttering it, but that belief in it cannot be taken to be true. 
The problem is that is can only be true and believed in 
worlds which are 'anti-symmetric', i.e. which are such that 
every doxastic alternative to them does not have them 
among its doxastic alternatives. 
I think that this interpretation of (2) helps us with what I 
still take to be the main problem of epistemology: not 
whether the sceptic is right but why he is wrong. Scepti-
cism seems to have found its niche in philosophical 
multiculturalism. While still unfashionable, it has become 
tolerated, or rather ignored. I think sceptics earn better 
than that. Even given that they cannot be proven wrong, 
their challenge still demands an answer, if not a treatment. 
I will argue that the cure to skepticism lies in epidemiology 




rather than epistemology: instead of attacking the sceptic 
head-long, I commend vaccinating our fellow non-sceptics 
against the virus. The way to go is not to argue that the 
sceptic is wrong, necessarily wrong or that he cannot be 
believed, but to show that he cannot convince. Scepticism 
requires a leap of faith: something we may justifiably 
refrain from even on the sceptic's own standards.  
Sceptics are not very good at mounting positive claims. 
Instead, they ask questions. I take the skeptic of concern 
to us to be someone who believes that no one ever knows 
anything. As we assume him to be rational, he will not 
qualify this belief of his as knowledge. The sceptic thus 
thinks that all our beliefs that we know something are false. 
The question he asks us is the following: ``How do you 
know that you know something?'' By taking his question to 
be rhetorical, he challenges our entitlement to any 
knowledge claims (claims of the form ``I know that p'') 
whatsoever. To meet the sceptic's challenge, we have to 
develop an account of knowledge that gives us the 
resources to defend against the sceptic the claim that we 
know something.  
The question of what to say to the sceptic lands us in a 
dilemma. The sceptic sketches a sceptical scenario, p, 
furnishes a description of what he takes to be a possible 
world in which we would not know what we claim to know. 
He then challenges us to explain to him why we think we 
are justified in excluding that scenario, i.e. to exclude its 
possible actuality. Given that we steadily stay non-
sceptics, we have to choose between two equally 
uncomfortable options: either we find a hidden contradic-
tion in what the sceptic presents as possible (which has 
turned out very difficult, if not impossible in many cases) or 
else we simply declare our psychological inability to 
believe him and thereby end the discussion before it even 
got started.  
A medium between these extremes, I think, is to take 
scepticism to be an epidemic: a contagious superstition, 
which, for fear of infection, we do better to isolate than to 
confront directly. Such a epidemiological rather than 
epistemological response requires some redefinition of 
what it means to meet the sceptical challenge: we do not 
have to convince those among us who are already infected 
with the sceptical virus; instead, we have to prevent the 
sceptical disease from propagating, i.e. to detain the 
sceptics among us of convincing others. In order to do this, 
we cannot stay with our own inability to believe the 
sceptics: we have to justify and to explain to others why we 
cannot get ourselves into believing them. Our inability to 
waive our knowledge claims has to be argued for -- in a 
way that shows (displays, not demonstrates) that it is not 
idiosyncratic, not prejudiced and not just a symptom of our 
unwillingness to consider their arguments. To meet the 
sceptical challenge, therefore, I have to win a three-person 
game: I, the antisceptic, have to convince you, the 
innocent bystander, that you should not believe the sceptic 
who is trying to convince you of the epistemic possibility of 
the scenario he sketches. I have to convince you that the 
reasons I have for not being a sceptic carry over, if you are 
not a sceptic already, to your case. Taking scepticism 
seriously, then, is to take it seriously as a threat. It is not 
necessarily trying to refute it: it is enough to show that 
what the sceptic takes to be possible is not possible for the 
two of us. 
I want to argue that one of the best known scenarios 
sceptics and anti-sceptics have produced so far is, for the 
sceptic, relevantly similar to the way Moore's paradox is for 
us: both of us are unable, by the very structure of our 
respective utterances, to produce conviction. Though they 
may be true and even believed to be true, the sceptic 
trying to convince us has to show more: he has to show 
that we are not epistemically required to disbelieve them to 
be false. Assuming that we are not deluded (¬p), the 
sceptic has to show us both that we are able to believe 
that we are deluded (p) and that we do not disbelieve that 
we are not deluded (¬D¬p). If belief in delusion would 
require disbelief in non-delusion, we would be justified in 
not wanting to give him his chance. Given that we already 
believe that we are not deluded, he would demand the 
epistemically impossible: to believe and disbelieve the 
same proposition. So the sceptic has to convince us of (2), 
i.e. that we are not deluded, but at the same time do not 
disbelieve we are not deluded. Only in this way he can 
overcome our cognitive resistance. I will argue that his task 
is hopeless. 
It is this commitment to a locally anti-symmetric alterna-
tiveness relation that justifies our reluctance to believe, 
even if it is for the sake of the sceptic's argument, that we 
do not disbelieve that his counterfactual sceptical scenario 
is actual. What the sceptic asks us to do, in effect, is to 
suspend our confidence in our knowledge claims, i.e. to 
accept the following as true: 
(3) I know that p, but I believe (for the sake of the 
argument) that I do not disbelieve that I do not know that 
p. 
If the second conjunct is true and I have the belief that I 
am lacking the confidence I actually have in my knowledge 
claims, then the first conjunct is true only in worlds which 
are not doxastic alternatives to any of my doxastic 
alternatives. Thus (3) asks us to epistemically place 
ourselves in worlds from which there is no road back to the 
world where we take ourselves to be. The suspension of 
my confidence is only problematic if I actually endorse the 
knowledge claims I have confidence in. That is why (3) is a 
problem for me, being a non-skeptic, but not for someone 
who is a skeptic already.  
If skepticism requires a leap of faith we have good 
reasons not to take, we treat the skeptic fairly in disbeliev-
ing him without proving him wrong.  
